It’s easy for many people to look back and say this was a bad move. But I’m with you. I too thought that the scheme would run well, and had high hopes for some of the big names we brought in.

The silver lining statement that you make also sounds correct to me. Good thoughts all.

did a pretty good job of replicating the paper plan, it just took them a while. Granted, based on what HT just showed us, the Packers probably had more appropriate players for the system. I wonder if the Broncos run contain had been built over the course of a couple of years, would the system have worked better for us. What if we had kept the old scheme in place while collecting the DT’s and OLB’s we needed over a year or two. The Broncos tried to fill the gaps with whoever was available through FA, which was pretty much nobody. If they had taken a more patient approach I think they would have been able to make pick ups and draft picks to transition into the new scheme without having to trash a season by plugging in pieces that did not fit. Or they could have trashed the season, held true and gone shopping the next year, but lets face it, rebuilding is a bad word around Dove Valley.

That being said, I am thrilled that HT thinks the Broncos are going back to the show blitz system, it was the most fun to watch. Having speed back in the LB corps should make this a very different season, in my naive opinion.

I’m tempted to provide a lengthy response on your communism analogy. I have a degree in political science, and I’m certainly well-armed in this area. A better way of answering the question would be to refer to the topic on the prospects of success for the San Francisco and Denver organizations. Sometimes a massive overhaul of a team’s way of playing is successful. Many of the new ideas in football required a radical transformation by the players and coaching staff, and there’s little doubt that many of the players resisted those changes—at least, initially.

I won’t pass judgment on the Run Contain scheme itself, especially since it has had some success elsewhere, but I think last year provides a lesson on how the Broncos organization responded to a problem with the wrong solution, and the solution was wrong because Denver’s problems had less to do with their scheme than with a series of unproductive drafts and an over-reliance on FAs.

One way to look at the Broncos’ problems is to use an analytical construct—personnel V. scheme. The idea is to examine how much of Denver’s problems were due to their scheme and how much were due to their level of talent. The two are never separate in the real world, so it’s a contrived exercise, but it’s still possible to draw some conclusions. Denver’s personnel problems began earlier than people believe, they started in the 90s. Partly there were some unproductive drafts (although not all), and partly it was the poor dratting position that comes with a good record. Free agency was never the problem, even though I speak of the “over-reliance” on free agency as a problem. What free agency did was mask the fact that Denver’s talent level was in slow decline, which is what you would expect from a team that reached the pinnacle of their sport.

Zooming forward in time - Shanahan’s, and the staff’s, dilemma immediately prior to 2007 was to rejuvenate a defense that was in decline. Denver’s well-deserved reputation as a quality organization had made it easy to attract FAs, and the solution they arrived at was to employ a novel defensive scheme populated with FAs. Looking at Denver’s personnel irrespective of scheme, it’s doubtful that they had the talent to be one of the better defenses - especially after Wilson’s injury. Of course, the real world experiment included the scheme, and we all saw how that worked out, but the tendency is now is to regard the scheme as the problem instead of examining Denver’s level of talent.

Even though it would be easy to fall into the cognitive trap of blaming last year’s problems on the defensive scheme, the silver lining is that Shanahan appears to have learned from last year’s debacle and revamped the organization. This year’s scheme - whatever it may be - will help, but I don’t think anyone is expecting instant greatness (homers excepted). However, there has been departure from past practices in the type of FA and draft pick, and I think this reveals a radical transformation in the criteria that the Broncos use to evaluate talent. The differences will appear subtle at first in terms of the on-the-field performance, but there are extremely important differences in the psychological dynamics that should eventually pay off in terms of team chemistry.

Well, not exactly. GB runs the system so well that they’ve kept it (and nickname Bates “The Guru”). Miami also had terrific success with the system. It can be replicated, but needs the right player types at the right positions.

What do you mean by *sp?

If you go back through my old archives (under the MHR University. itself under sections) you’ll read some of my comments about media people and others who throw around technical terms and try to sound self-important. Some of these terms I try to explain (such as an article on “technique and gaps”), and others are just often mis-used. Others, while technicaly correct (such as a long winded play name) sound impressive, but only serve to alienate people who want to learn about the game.

If I’m not teaching anything, or if I’m talking over someone’s head, I’m doing a poor job. The best compliment I can get is when someone says they’ve learned something, and it was written in a way that could be understood. Thank ou for making me feel that my work is worth the time! (And if you want to go back and rewatch the games with nwfound knowledge, I’m really doing something right!)

Thanks for the “thanks” and thanks (as always) for being here!

MIA hasn’t run the system since 2004. GB ran the system from 2004 to present.

in practice, it appears this system is about stopping the pass, no? i remember a miami player stating that right after we hired bates. he said it was a vanilla, bend-don’t-break defense designed to limit the pass. is he wrong?

The system is designed to stop the run, force the pass, and increase risks for the offense. The risks include more passing (and interceptions), as well as a swarm approach when the runner cuts back to the middle of the field (fumbles). Bend-don’t-break is accurate to a point, in that the run should give up a few yards, but never a break away. But I wouldn’t call it vanilla (most articles you read call the scheme complicated), and I wouldn’t call it bend-don’t-break when the SS is in the box either.

For a read on the success of the Miami defense under Bates, here is a post from Wikipedia:

Before the 2000 season, Dave Wannstedt, formerly of the Chicago Bears, became the new coach, and ex-Jacksonville Jaguars backup Jay Fiedler became the new quarterback, even though former Marino backup Damon Huard had been considered the favorite. Despite lowered expectations, the defense broke through with Jason Taylor and Trace Armstrong each getting 10 sacks, and four players (Sam Madison, Brian Walker, Brock Marion and Patrick Surtain) tallying at least five interceptions. All-pro linebacker Zach Thomas also contributed many tackles. In addition, Lamar Smith rushed for 1,139 yards, and Miami finished atop the AFC East with an 11-5 record. In the first round of the playoffs, Miami took the Indianapolis Colts to overtime and won on a Lamar Smith touchdown run. Smith finished with 209 yards on 40 carries, but in the next round, the Dolphins were shut out by the Oakland Raiders, and a worn-out Smith was barely able to run.

The 2001 offseason brought in rookie Chris Chambers at wide receiver, but Trace Armstrong left, as did two offensive linemen, Richmond Webb, a Pro Bowl anchor since 1990, and Kevin Donnalley. During the 2001 season, the Dolphins relied on a strong defense to finish 11-5, earning a Wild Card spot and finishing second in the AFC East behind the eventual Super Bowl champions, the New England Patriots. The Dolphins lost in the first round of the playoffs 20-3 to the Baltimore Ravens.

Miami revitalized its running game in time for the 2002 season by trading for New Orleans Saints running back Ricky Williams. In addition, rookie tight end Randy McMichael made his presence felt. The Dolphins, behind a new offensive scheme under freshly hired offensive coordinator Norv Turner, and a power running game led by Williams, quickly rushed out to a 5-1 start, including an incredible last minute comeback by Fiedler against the Broncos. However, Fiedler injured his thumb and would be out for an extended period of time. This intrigued some Dolphins fans, who believed backup Ray Lucas could outdo the much-maligned Fiedler. However, Lucas was abysmal in his first two games and merely average in his third, and the team dropped three straight. Miami rebounded with wins over Baltimore and an impressive thumping of San Diego, but lost to Buffalo. Still, Miami pulled off an impressive win over the Oakland Raiders and sat at 9-5 with two weeks left in the season, in prime position to steal the AFC East. However, despite dominating the New England Patriots for most of the game in Week 17, the Dolphins blew an 11-point lead late in the fourth quarter of a devastating loss. Due to a tiebreaker, both the Dolphins and Patriots lost out on the playoffs as the Jets took the AFC East title. Many fans called for Wannstedt’s firing, but he was kept on for the 2003 season. Despite it all, the team believed it had plenty to look forward to, as Ricky Williams broke Dolphins records with 1,853 rushing yards and 16 touchdowns on the ground.

The 2003 Miami Dolphins were a hard team to pinpoint. The defense was again solid and forced a lot of turnovers, and opposing offenses found running the ball extremely difficult. However, poor offensive line play (despite most of the starters returning) gave little room for Ricky to run, and the offense was stagnant. The Dolphins began with a repeat of 2002’s season end, with a complete meltdown against the Houston Texans, but they rebounded to win four straight games. During a crushing overtime loss at the hands of the Patriots, Jay Fiedler was injured, forcing newly acquired backup Brian Griese to lead the Dolphins to victory the next week over San Diego. That, however, was Griese’s high point, and after a good showing against Indianapolis in a losing effort, he was lousy against the Titans and highly ineffective against the Ravens. When Griese and the Dolphins fell behind to the Washington Redskins, Jay Fiedler came off the bench and saved their season, leading them to a comeback victory, 24-23. Miami looked like it might rebound thanks to a victory over the Dallas Cowboys that took them to 8-4, but two key losses to the Patriots and the Eagles ended Miami’s postseason hopes. Miami finished 10-6, but was still short of a playoff spot.

The 2004 offseason was disastrous for the Dolphins. Tight end Randy McMichael was arrested for domestic violence and wide receiver David Boston (signed from San Diego) suffered an injury in training camp and missed the entire season (Boston also failed a drug test for steroids later in the season). But the biggest shock came when Ricky Williams retired for then-unspecified reasons, until it was eventually revealed that a) Williams had recently suffered his third strike under the NFL’s substance abuse policy, and b) to a lesser degree felt he was unnecessarily overused by Wannstedt. Many experts predicted a disastrous season for the Dolphins. These predictions proved right as Miami dropped their first six games of the 2004 season, marking the worst start in franchise history at the time. After the team fell to 1-8, Wannstedt resigned on November 9, 2004. He was replaced on an interim basis by defensive coordinator Jim Bates. The Dolphins fared slightly better under Bates, winning three of their final seven games, including a 29-28 upset victory over the defending champion Patriots on December 20 in a nationally televised Monday Night Football contest. Despite this, the Dolphins decided not to hire Bates for the permanent coaching position.

Currently, GB respects the system enough to keep running it (MIA doesn’t run it), and the current defensive coordinator and assistants still refer to Bates as the Guru.

I love the HS memories, and appreciate the thoughts!

...but really, the great number of truly great posts come from all of our members. In fact, we’re looking forward to you giving it a go in the near future!

We do it for:

1. The love of the community at MHR,
2. The love of our Broncos team,
3. The love of our fearless leader Guru,
4. The love of the game.

We wouldn’t turn down payment, but I don’t think any of the staff does it for the hope or want of money either.

You are one of the reasons for the site!

Welcome!

A lot of good points in there. I think we have the offense to match up with the elite teams you mentioned. I think everything falls on the defense (as you point out).

and your primary point about job specific talent level is well noted. So many of our dline and backers are of the quick, athletic type (as far as the young talent goes) and on top of that, the guys like Ek, Engleberger, Peterson are all of the cheaper “versatile” variety, where they aren’t really powerhouses in any one area, but consistent in most. I think it makes a great combination for, as you mention, a penetrating, high pressure defense that forces QBs to make mistakes or eat turf.

I’ll add one thing to your list of benefits reaped from the Bates’ experiment: though the short term cost was high, I think giving DJ some experience with double teams and shedding blockers should help him become one of the all time broncos greats at LB, especially WLB. I can’t help but think he has a probowl year coming up, and will be nigh unstoppable…