I read a similar (though not as thorough) study a year ago, by footballoutsiders. I guess the plan is to:

a) trade out of round one (or at least to the very bottom of it),

b) trade away existing but underproducing and expensive players for picks, and finally

c) trade away picks this year for higher picks next year.

These are the makings of a draft, that will give management failing grades in most MSM report cards.

Nice find Broncoman. I haven’t read the whole thing, but there is no doubt they have a strong case. Anything that spawned from Jerry Jones should be called into question regularly…

This is great reading, 50 some pages or not.

I’ve felt for a long time, that if a team doesn’t have an obvious targeted pick they should trade down. Just skimmed the article but it seems to confirm it.

Why oh why do fans waste their time with ESPN when there’s infinitely better stuff here!

One of the many points it engendered was the bizarre compensation system inherent within the drafting process. It’ has been, and conintues to be, utterly irrational. We benefited from that last year, although we have fallen before it in the past.

I was thinnking of the run on O line players last year. It started with Jake Long, who is a good player. But his compensation is vastly over that of Clady. Is he a better performer? Certainly not, statistically. But he is more highly paid, and I appreciate that fact that his draft status lead us to take Clady, who was my own (unscientific!) 1st choice.

KC took a flyer un an unproven lineman who has worked out – sort of. Branden Albert flew up the draft board and is only adequate, from what I can find. He’s overpaid. Glenn Dorsey? We’ll find out in 2 years, perhaps. Chris Wlliams and Gosder Chelius ended up pushing Jeff Otah to Carolina, where he fought though injury and became a solid player – some early mocks had him in the high first picks. What happened?

The process is a wonderful crapshoot with a life of its own. Derrick Harvey and Vernon Gholston are suddenly franchise players. They flew up the boards late – I never quite figured out why. The compensation we would pay these players is rarely in line with there production, and almost never their early production. Yet, that’s the system.

I appreciate even more the interactions of the Goodman crew. They knew, somehow, that Cutler was a far better QB than Young (shudder) or Leinart (oy). They nailed Clady, who by the grace of the strange system fell to us. Perhaps they will do equally well this year. There are those who have an eye for pro football talent, and that defies statistics and requires the knowledgeable study of film.

Or, perhaps the statistical fact that we can do far better with a few higher picks than one very high one will come into it. I only know that watching the spectacle is at times just as remarkable and enjoyable as watching the games.

There is a lot of wisdom in knowing that we don’t know, but the entire system is in place, in part, to tell us that despite our eyes, the scouts can assure us that the Emperor’s new clothes are remarkably beautiful. Great find, Broncoman!

But I did hear that Jarvis was a Shanahan decision based on film he was given, so I’ll give the Goodman’s a ’Maybe" on him.

I wonder if the MSM didn’t talk about this because it is rational, detailed and contradicts the essence of their (and the scouts) jobs? It’s a doozy

I breezed through most of the article, and I’ll have to re-read it again later.

There’s one point that should be made — the value (in terms of performance) goes up the higher the pick is, so the problem (so to speak) is not with high picks but with a rookie salary structure that gives the highest picks more than they’re worth. A re-working of the CBA (and value chart) that flattens the salary structure for high picks could eliminate this problem.

This is a subject that’s dear to my heart, that is — decision theory. And expectations of superbly rational GMs making infinitely wise decisions are unrealistic. Moreover, mixing a few overpaid but highly performing draftees and FAs into the team’s mix may be the only way to go. The higher surplus value of 2nd rounders versus 1st rounders is a statement about a higher cost-benefit ratio; not a statement of lower benefit bottom line.

We were lucky to pick Clady rather than Baker, but there’s a message here. We might be better off building depth through relatively high picks rather than trying to the find the magic bullet by hunting for the next superstar. And, perhaps more than anything else, for all those posters obsessed with picking the winners and losers in the next draft, a little humility might be in order. Overconfidence is one of the most common cognitive biases, and it leads otherwise bright people to overestimate their abilities to predict.

A part of me keeps wondering who we would have taken had Clady been gone…..