My feeling is that BPA has become a dogmatic belief. This is also true for drafting for need.

My guess is that fans DO follow your example of ‘shopping hungry’ and view almost any attractive athlete as desirable regardless of positional fit and other considerations. As with the shopping hungry metaphor, it’s an impulse purchase, one that’s guided by the reverie of being in the presence of so many new toys. We’ve all had these moments as children around Christmas. It’s the rush we feel upon entering a store’s toy department and seeing the cornucopia of possible gifts. Our thinking process at this moment is euphoric, we’re allowed to give in to our desires. It’s no coincidence that fans read football magazines in the same way as they once perused Christmas catalogs (and still may).

The very notion of BPA gives the impression that athletes are “better” and imbues them with a ‘must have’ quality. Again, much like Christmas shopping reverie analogy, the desire for particular players is like the "hot toy’ phenomenon. Players are desired, not because of a pragmatic consideration of how their skills may help a team, but because they possess an indescribable something that marks them as hot properties. It’s less a concrete decision than an attachment to the possibility they represent, and an accompanying dread of missing out on such a desirable commodity. Notice the emotional reaction that fans have upon hearing that their favorite prospects weren’t chosen. Their attachment to that ‘wished for’ choice is like a young boy’s desire for the latest ‘hot toy.’ The news that he won’t be receiving that toy is treated like a calamity.

Let me change tack here on the subject of drafting for need — “addressing a need” is similar to what often drives politics. Politicians MUST address problems, and — oddly — it’s even more important to address problems than actually solve them. The public’s focus is on the problem itself and solutions to the problem are expected to necessarily flow from politicians having a proper level of concern. This heightened public awareness of the problem doesn’t lend itself particularly well to producing reasonable solutions since many of the suggestions that arise are emotional outcries. NFL teams are caught in the same bind. Failing to address a need is seen in the same light as failing to address a problem.

The tendency to lose sight of actual solutions to team deficiencies is apparent in the clamor to address needs. Teams are hardly unaware of their needs but solving the problem requires careful consideration. Oddly, the public’s favorite solution, which is to draft defensive talent at an area of need, often falls short, because few rookies are capable of transforming a weakness into a strength early in their career. Teams rely on a variety of solutions; FAs are brought in, schemes and coaches are changed, and players are drafted (when available and appropriate), but their purpose is often more for the long run. It’s a gradual process, and it requires great care, which is not what the public is clamoring for. The types of massive changes that many fans propose would be disruptive if implemented, and the instant elevation of younger players before they’re ready could be detrimental to their careers. Quality organizations groom their athletes over a period of time and provide a framework that increases players’ chances of developing until they’re ready to assume starting roles. It’s not a crapshoot; it’s a carefully considered apprenticeship.

THERE ARE NO QUICK FIXES

What a lot of people didn’t like about this offseason was the way in which McX went about rebuilding the team. “Too many FAs were brought in,” it was said, “and they’re too old,” or, “not good enough to make a difference.” It’s not as if a Haynesworth, etc., wouldn’t have helped, but the greatest impact was achieved by bringing a greater number of FAs, and this is largely because the salary cap limits the cost-effectiveness of high priced additions, especially for teams in the rebuilding mode. Age — oddly — is not a problem, because younger players are more expensive, besides the fact that we’re only looking for someone to play until the younger players are ready to assume starting roles.

What many people disliked about our draft — the selection of offensive rather than defensive players in the late rounds — makes sense from a team building logistics point of view. The purpose of these picks was to specifically fill backup or niche roles, such as special teams or receivers in multiple sets. Starter quality 3-4 defensive players, the kind of player who could have had an impact, were unfortunately rare and all of them were taken by the end of the 2nd or 3rd round. It’s also the case that the deepest positions in the draft — receiver and offensive line — were where we went late, and the BPA at this point was quite likely to be at these positions because of the depth of the crop.

CONSERVING PICK VALUE

Value is preserved only when teams are able to convert pick value into meaningful assets. There’s a tendency to treat pick value like money and assume that savings can be pocketed and used on another day. In truth, you must spend your value wisely or forgo the chance to add in this draft. Previously, I tried to express this idea as saving money on an item you don’t really want. People have become so enamored with the abstract notion of picks that they’ll forfeit the opportunity to realize value currently in favor of modest gains in the future. Much like attitudes towards money, people are fixated with the value of the pick itself rather than what that pick can purchase. I referred to this as a stockpiling or cheap tool theory, in which we let price dictate our buying choices and buy the cheapest item even when it’s not what you want. This emphasis on cheapness over quality has become ingrained in our thinking. In the case of the draft, clinging to this abstract notion usually produces more of a less desired commodity, and this commodity is often cut. These are losses, too, but whereas people will vehemently argue against extravagance dudring the draft they will largely ignore the later waste when players are cut, and/or frame these losses separately as an unforeseeable and unavoidable outcome.

Defensive lineman take time to develop, as statistical analysis shows, and it’s ridiculous to think that Moss and Crowder are judged by two years’ that included Bates’ run contain and Slowik’s scheme of last year.

Regarding Smith — he and all of our picks are instant impact types because they’re slotted for positions they’ve played and produced in. There’s still a learning curve, of course, but no one is projected at a position they haven’t already played. Some of the picks were drafted as developmental prospects, such as Brandstater, but that’s part of the objective with later picks.

I view Alphonso Smith as a “slot CB,” which is an adjustment many DCs are making to the multiple receiver sets in which a Royal/Stokley type brutalizes the typical 2nd string CBs used in nickel formations. I guess having a slot specialist who’s more familiar with the coverage responsibilities is subtly different than merely having a nickel with that assignment.

Our draft was very much geared to immediate contribution — actually. And that was part of the point in trading next year’s 1st to Seattle for the rights to pick Smith. We brought all of the value we obtained for Cutler, as well as next year’s 5th, into this year. The point was to make this year’s team as good as possible — now.

BTW — I was looking at last year’s lineup in the media guide and it’s hard to see how we wouldn’t be better this year. I think the “Kool-aid” charge could be made against our attitude towards last year’s team. We’ve yet to see them play, of course, but the depth situation is much better this year.

I ran across some thorough analysis of how teams fared after switching to the 3-4. I don’t know if I should hope we make a complete switch this year based on this analysis, but the indications are that it’s better to go whole hog than halfway in a hybrid.

My feeling is that personnel is important, even though it shows otherwise. The frequency with which we use a 3 man front will depend on how well they perform.

The big positive is that there’s a pronounced improvement in run stopping. In fact, that may be the most important — and overlooked — reason for making the switch. It’s also part of why we needed to strengthen our pass defense, in an anticipatory compensatory reaction to expected gains in run defense.

This last point concerning building the pass defense is yet another that’s been grossly misunderstood by the pundits. To use a caricature — “why build your pass defense? You need pass rushing ability or it’s a waste.” I don’t know that we’ll be much better at pass rushing (but it’s hard to be worse), but there’s no reason we need to wait to fix our run stopping ability and secondary while we work on our pass rush.

If the team is playing as hard as they can then I have no gripe with them as far as winning or losing. It’s when they look confused and lackadaisical, that’s when I get mad. And players who go sit on the bench after a bad play and pout. I can see that sometimes a player may need to collect his thoughts and regroup himself, but, then get up and rally the team to play better. Nice job PO.

At the beginning of the draft, I was pissed. I thought our coaches had fallen off the wagon. It took until Sunday evening before I began to understand their thought process.
That’s what happened to most folks last year – and then we met Eddie Royal and a few other folks. I look forward to a similar experience this year!